If the present regime is not going to fail through
total economic collapse,
and is not going away through
maybe it will collapse through secession. That, after all, is a large
part of what happened to the USSR and to Yugoslavia. If the breakaway
regions then fight, as in Yugoslavia, that would produce a total
For Britain, that just isn’t going to happen. Scotland looks quite
likely to secede, but if it does, that won’t really be a significant
event — the progressive UK state would become a progressive rump-UK
state, and an even more progressive Scottish state. The continuity of
the establishment and its ideology would be total.
Wales might also secede, with the same non-effect, though that seems
less likely. However, England itself I cannot see breaking up without
a social collapse happening first — there just aren’t regional
identities or regional institutions strong enough to become
Northern Ireland could return to disorder if the British government
lost control. While the actual scale of the Troubles was relatively
restricted — even at their height Belfast was less violent than several
US cities, and Luton this year (10th shooting yesterday) is running it
fairly close — it could conceivable get much worse. Frankly, I doubt
it: the concept of nationalism is too weakened in the West now to
support the escalation.
Actually, a bigger deal than Scotland seceding from Britain would be
Britain seceding from the EU. This seems slightly less far-fetched
today, with UKIP running close to the Tories in the polls, than it did
a few years ago. It would be a bigger blow to the dominant ideology —
European transnationalism is more fundamental to the ruling class than
old-fashioned British Unionism. At the end of the day, though, the
ruling establishment could perfectly well regain control inside or
outside of the EU institutions, and a British withdrawal might in fact
strengthen the grip of the ruling class by suppressing their more
unsustainable excesses. Competitive pressure between Britain and the
rump EU would make both more effective.
Alternatively, British withdrawal might trigger a partial or total
disintegration of the EU, by breaking its illusion of
inevitability. That would be a blow to the elite, but I still don’t
think it would defeat them. At the end of the day even UKIP and
similar forces in Germany and elsewhere are within the progressive
consensus, and as they approached power the normal mechanisms of
politics would make them more moderate. The net effect would be a kind
of 1980s-style retreat and consolidation of progressivism on some
fronts, rather than a defeat.
In the US, things may be rather different. There, I think secession is
a bigger threat to the progressive elite than it is in Europe. There
are regional identities and institutions that could form breakaway
nation-states, and which would have to reject more than a couple of
decades of “progress” to do so.
The entity of the Union is so closely identified with the progressive
ideology that secession is probably a necessary step in an American
Reaction. Before reactionary forces are able to take over the whole
USA, they will be strong enough to take over a section of it and
tear it out of the union.
The main reason for doubting that secession is the first step in the
American Reaction is that the Federal Government is strong enough and
determined enough to prevent it. An attempt to simply grow a
reactionary seccessionist movement in a favourable state or set of
states would merely repeat the recent unpleasantness, probably more
decisively than before.
The Federal Government has to be crippled first, then a reactionary
element can secede. The causes already examined — economic failure and
hollowing-out — are not sufficient for this. Something else must
That will be the next article in this series.