In previous
articles
I’ve looked at several possible paths to a failure of the progressive
hegemony, but which either are not feasible by themselves, or are not
sufficient by themselves to destroy the existing governing structures.
The vital missing piece, which I believe is the key step after which
the old order is finished and the new order must be built, is the
loss of faith of the ruling class themselves.
That is what actually finished the USSR, it finished the Commonwealth of England, and for that matter it is what sadly finished off
European Monarchism in the 19th Century. The
secessions,
the final
hollowing-out,
did happen, but were consequences of the collapse of belief in the
political
formula
of the state by the rulers themselves.
Do not be fooled into thinking that the dogmas of liberalism are
merely convenient fictions to the priests and practitioners of the
democratic state. We are ruled by True Believers. If they were
cynically parotting the mantras of democracy and equality we would
probably be better governed than we are.
Some of the contradictions of the progressive faith are indeed visible
to these people, but they live with them as best they can: after all,
every faith has its mysteries. The faithful either study them and
attempt to rationalise them, or else brush them aside as a problem for
other people to solve. The faith holds.
But there could come a time when it does not. A few dissenters here
and there are of no consequence: they can be driven out and
replaced. However, it can come to pass that it becomes general
knowledge that the axioms of the faith are false. Then the true
believers will be diluted and finally swamped by the cynical
opportunists. They will, for a time, retain the doctrines as empty
justifications, but while they rely on them for their legitimacy,
without genuine belief they will have no reason to defend them into
the future. They become subject to erosion by the normal exigencies of
political competition; abandoned bit by bit as tactics demand. The
final stage arrives when nobody important genuinely believes them, and
also, vitally, everybody knows that nobody important genuinely
believes them.
(That last condition is why, though the loss of belief
is gradual, the final collapse is sudden).
At that point, the regime retains the instruments of power, but has
lost its legitimacy. But, as Chesterton observed, when faith goes it
is not replaced with nothing. It will be replaced with something. The
state will be reconfigured, either gradually or abruptly, to reflect
some alternative political formula.
If the state is efficient at dealing with internal apostasy, then it
will switch its beliefs after the ideas of the broader society. It
will absorb the new reality socially, from the community that its
members engage with at an intellectual level. That is why I say that
spreading our ideas matters, but simple numerical majority is not the
goal. The elite don’t care now what the ordinary man believes, and
they aren’t going to start. But they care what their peers think —
they care what their doctor thinks, what writers think, and what their
staff think, and maybe even what television comedians think. That is
why it is necessary to project the ideas beyond the obsessives, to
integrate theory and
practice.
Ordinary
educated people have to mention to their ordinary friends and
colleagues, over coffee or a pint, that they don’t believe that
democracy is worth preserving. That’s the most powerful propaganda
there is. The ideas have to be developed further and spread more
widely through the obsessives before they can start to enter the
culture that way, but I think the start of that phase is not far off,
no more than a few years.
When the opinions of what the rulers are forced to think of as
“sensible people” become overwhelming, their own beliefs will
follow. Then we get the period of total hypocrisy, and after that the
final discrediting of the old formula.
All the failures I looked at before — economic, administrative,
military — can contribute to the discrediting of the formula, but that
belief is the ultimate indicator of whether the structure will hold or
fall.
From an activist point of view, once it does fall, it is too late to
do anything. The intelligentsia by that stage have long since stopped
believing in the old formula, and they almost certainly already
believe in another one. Whatever happens on the ground, that new
formula will dictate what the new order looks like. It might not be
clear-cut, there might be conflict and disagreement, but any conflict
will be between people who already have power and already know what
they believe.
The best case, for Britain, is that the heresy that quietly spreads
through the elite until it has gone far enough to come into the open,
is that the Royal Family will do a better job than the democratic
system. The best case for the USA, as far as I can see from here, is
that there should be some kind of breakup, with regions perhaps
adopting different formulae.
Neither looks very likely right now, but the collective loss of faith
does not look very close, either. There is still time. Our work is to
build a theory
that is good enough to win over the desperate, ten or twenty or fifty
years from now, when belief in democracy and equality becomes
unsupportable. It doesn’t need to be popular today, but it needs to be
solid, thorough, adaptable, tested in intellectual debate.
By preparing such a theory, we are not just
“waiting for a collapse”.
We are both bringing about the end of the present regime (since the
old political formula will be discarded more quickly if there is a
practical alternative), and winning the battle to succeed it. Once the
collapse becomes visible, the die is already cast. The real battle of
ideas has already been fought, already won or lost. Attempting to
force out the rulers, either by violence or by election, while the
bulk of them still believe in their ideals, might conceivably succeed,
but it can only be a revolution, not a restoration. The new regime
would lack legitimacy except as the representative of the
revolutionary movement which created it. If reactionaries were to
attempt this, the best they could create would be a kind of
revolutionary-reactionary hybrid — in short, fascism.
On the other hand, if the holders of official and unofficial power
under the Modern Structure themselves recognise reactionary ideas,
then the restoration is the legitimate successor to the present
regime. It can demand loyalty from everyone on the basis of defending
peace, stability, order and unity in a way that a party-based
fascist regime cannot.
That does not mean there will be no violence required to secure the
regime, but the holdouts will be self-evidently rebels — not just
against the new order but against the old. That will be the time for
action and glory — not as guerillas or revolutionaries, but as
soldiers of honour: loyal knights of the rightful Sovereign. (I will
have an urgent dental appointment that day, unfortunately, but I will
wish you fame and victory).
It is also conceivable that the elite could hold out, clinging to the
old beliefs after the rest of the culture has rejected them. I do not
expect that — none of them have the moral courage it would require. If
I am wrong, then a more activist penultimate phase would be called for
— the formation of a shadow government or government-in-exile, leading
to a final popular uprising. The culture must be won over first, in
any case.
There are two things that make it possible now to break the
centuries-long trend of more and more extreme liberalism. One is the
over-extension of liberalism — its destructiveness is getting more
obvious. The other is communication technology. In the past the
Cathedral really could swamp out intellectual dissent, and make it
invisible. Twenty-five years ago, our important thinkers simply would
not have been able to reach an audience. The strength of the Cathedral
in the battle of ideas is its obvious dominance: the impression it can
give that there are no alternatives. The only way to publicise dissent
was through activism — forming parties, pressure groups. That works as
outreach, but it is self-defeating, because it crushes the movement
between humiliation, caused by playing the enemy at their own game and
losing, and compromise, which is necessary to the strategy, but destroys
the intellectual integrity of the ideas being advanced.
Bringing the arguments into the political arena automatically
discredits them. They can only hold the status of an alternative
belief system if they are kept out of party politics, where all
arguments are required to be judged by their immediate consequences,
never by their merits. If, say, HBD is advanced as a reason for
opposing a particular immigration bill, then it is automatically
false,
and cannot be considered further. If it is not associated with one
political faction or another, then it remains an “academic” question,
which seekers after truth can consider on its merits. Heritage’s
cowardice in the Richwine affair is a good thing: as politicians, they
are just as damaging to reason as their opponents. It is better that
reactionary views are completely driven out of mainstream politics, as
that preserves the distance between reactionaries and
politicians. There can be no victory through gradual change: adoption
of any reactionary ideas must be accompanied by total rejection of the
old formula. If reactionary views are banned, that is better still,
since it draws that clear line between the present body of thought and
the next.Labels: collapse